It is internationally acknowledged that small and medium enterprises (SMEs) play a vital role in enhancing a country's economic growth and in creating jobs. It is therefore in the public interest and in the interests of all governments to support SMEs.
Introduction
It is internationally acknowledged that small and medium enterprises play a vital role in economic development by stimulating economic growth and redistributing the responsibility and opportunities for wealth and job creation (Martins 2001) . Many publications and institutions refer to small enterprises as SMEs or SMMEs (Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises) and various definitions have been suggested (European Commission 2005) . The SME industry in South Africa is acknowledged to be a key performance area, as was demonstrated by research done on behalf of the Ntsika Enterprise Promotion Agency, which has highlighted the importance of SMEs and their contribution to employment (DTI 2004:47-51) .
The South African government has actively promoted small business by implementing several initiatives to streamline the business environment in which small enterprises operate. Some of the measures that were introduced were the restructuring of selected labour regulations and the provision of tax relief. Although these measures did bring some welcome relief and although government seems committed to continuing to try to make life easier for small and medium enterprises, the Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service (SARS), Pravin Gordhan, has acknowledged that compliance with the tax regime is still a considerable burden for small businesses (Mahabane 2005) . A report by consultants from an independent private sector development and research organisation, SBP (originally the Small Business Project), confirms that regulations in respect of taxes are the most burdensome of all the regulations that affect business operations (SBP 2005:32) .
In 2005, the authors of this article, together with other members of the Department of Taxation at the University of South Africa, conducted an investigation into the tax function in small and medium manufacturing concerns operating in the Gauteng Province in South Africa in order to contribute to the understanding of the tax environment in which small business enterprises in South Africa operate. The authors of this article made extensive use of the results of this investigation in compiling this article (University of South Africa 2005).
Purpose of the article
This article aims to report on the obstacles that small business entities encounter when they try to comply with tax requirements, and to suggest some solutions.
3 Theoretical perspective on tax compliance
Prevalence of non-compliance
Governments need to levy taxes to enable them to provide efficient services and infrastructure. However, this does not mean that their citizens are always happy to pay the taxes levied on them -in fact, it is common knowledge that many taxpayers (intentionally) try to reduce the amount of tax that they have to pay. Most evasion takes the form of underreported income, the claiming of higher deductions than the taxpayer is entitled to and failing to file tax returns (Webley, Robben, Elffers & Hessing 1991:3-7) .
Reasons for non-compliance
An early model that attempted to explain why taxpayers avoid paying taxes was put forward by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) . They formulated a simple (classic) model based on the assumption that people are influenced by the rate of tax and the probability of detection. This model predicts, not surprisingly, that an increase in the penalty rate and an increase in the probability of detection will result in more income being declared. However, simultaneously, given that people tend to 'evade' penalties on tax rather than conceal income, the model predicts that non-compliance will decrease even with rising tax rates. The model also incorporates the non-monetary variable of 'reputation', as well as risk aversion, and predicts that where the discovery of non-compliance can lead to the auditing of past tax returns, more income will be declared in following years. Vogel (1974) indicates that penalties may be less of a deterrent than the probability of being caught. Klepper and Nagin (1989) show that perceived probabilities of detection vary according to the nature of the particular kind of declaration made.
There is a vast body of literature on tax compliance that details various attempts to describe tax resistance and to identify and explain the factors which influence compliance. Cowell (1990) , Kinsey (1984) and Roth and Scholz (1989) offer comprehensive reviews of some of the seminal studies in this regard. Researchers have also highlighted several elements of financial self-interest, of which the most important are the possibility of detection, penalties for non-compliance, the tax rate structure and the taxpayer's level of income. The main problem with economic models is, however, that people pay more tax than these models predict. This realisation has led researchers to turn to sociology and psychology in an attempt to explain taxpayer behaviour. This type of research has prompted the construction of interactive behavioural models that recognise the fact that taxpayers are individuals and that they do not make decisions in isolation. A taxpayer's inherent character and situation, as well as the behaviour of other taxpayers and the authorities, may have an impact on the compliance decisions of taxpayers. Therefore, social psychological variables like stigma, reputation and social norms should also be taken into account when one tries to predict non-compliance (Vogel 1974; Lewis 1982:169-172; Webley et al. 1991:21) . The literature also includes contributions regarding the importance of selected background factors (Torgler & Schneider 2001) , enforcement (Allingham & Sandmo 1972; Cowell 1985) , equity, fairness (Cowell 1990 ) and taxpayers' attitudes, beliefs and norms (Niemirowski, Baldwin & Wearing 2003) . Chattopadhyay and Das Gupta (2002) summarise some of the important determinants of compliance. They specifically mention, inter alia, tax complexity; and compliance costs.
Remedies against non-compliance
Both the South African authorities and the local courts have shown their disapproval of tax evasion. The remedies they have introduced to combat the avoidance of tax include the following measures: The Income Tax Act (No. 58 of 1962) contains a general anti-avoidance provision (section 103) and a number of specific anti-avoidance provisions; the Commissioner has extensive powers of audit and inspection; SARS uses risk profiling and audit tools to improve audit effectiveness; tax offenders have been named in the media; and there have recently been two amnesties (1995 and 2003) . Furthermore, the South African tax system has undergone significant reform regarding its administrative efficiency and client service. The South African tax authorities therefore seem to have followed a theoretically sound strategy to restrain tax evaders from not complying and encouraging them to pay. As a result, they have been fairly successful in their tax collection efforts (Smith 2003) , although both the Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel, and the Commissioner for SARS, Pravin Gordhan, have indicated that SARS can still improve on its record (Manuel 2004; Mahabane 2005) .
Studies on tax compliance in South Africa
Relatively few tax compliance studies have been conducted in South Africa since 1994. Alm and Martinez-Vazquez (2001) and Cummings, Martinez-Vazquez, McKee and Torgler (2004) analysed tax compliance in South Africa, using laboratory experiments conducted in 1999, field data collected for the World Values Survey in 1996 and the Afro barometer in 2000. Their findings confirm that tax compliance exceeds predictions using the conventional economic models and they indicate that compliance is closely related to how tax institutions and government behaviour are perceived. Alm and Martinez-Vazquez (2001) conclude that social norms play an important role in compliance decisions in South Africa, but they point out that these issues are not fully understood. Lombard (2002) comments on the service delivery levels of SARS. Smith (2003) and Friedman (2003) identify the need to understand the taxpaying culture and taxpayers' behaviour. Hlophe and Friedman (2002) feel that there is some room for improvement in the transformation of taxpayer attitudes.
Research strategy
From August to October 2005, the Department of Taxation at the University of South Africa (where the authors of this article are employed), in partnership with the Bureau for Market Research, conducted a research project on the tax function in manufacturing SMEs in Gauteng, South Africa. This project consisted of a thorough investigation of the tax environment in which small and medium businesses in South Africa operate, as well as a survey among a sample of SMEs operating in Gauteng. The survey was done via a combination of self-administered questionnaires sent to the respondents via e-mail or a fax and face-to-face personal interviews. The authors of this article also conducted a review of the literature on tax compliance world-wide in general and in South Africa in particular in order to interpret the results obtained from the primary research.
The sample population for the primary research consisted of 75 small enterprises (with between 20 and 50 employees) and medium enterprises (with between 51 and 200 employees) operating in the manufacturing industry in Gauteng. Very small enterprises (those with fewer than 20 employees) were ignored, as it was expected that the tax function in enterprises of this kind would probably not be structured and would most probably be run by one person only. Financial managers, general managers, accountants and owners of SMEs were targeted as sample elements/respondents.
A multiple-stage sample approach was applied to draw a probability sample proportionate to the class of the number of employees in an SME. After verifying the SME database in terms of duplication and foreign elements, the sample units (manufacturing establishments) were randomly selected for inclusion in the survey using the SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences). The final sample sizes were limited by time and financial constraints. However, the samples were drawn in such a manner as to secure a minimum of at least 30 questionnaires per sub-sample category (see Table 1 ). Table 1 shows the size of the total population (N) according to the BMR (Bureau for Market Research) records on SME manufacturers and the final sample sizes (n) per SME category. The figures in Table 1 show that the final sample size supports the principles of proportionate stratified sampling. The final sample size per SME category is also regarded as sufficient to support sound statistical analysis per SME category. Furthermore, the proportionate stratified sampling approach suggests that no data weighting is required to support the statistical analysis. This reflects a self-weighting design. The SPSS statistical software package was used to analyse the data.
Results of the research

Complexity
The literature review confirms that the complexity of a tax system can be an obstacle for small enterprises that wish to comply with tax regulations. It is evident that SMEs in South Africa could be liable for up to 11 different taxes (income tax, capital gains tax, provisional tax, secondary tax on companies, value-added tax, employees' tax, employment-related levies, customs and excise duties, transfer duty, donations tax and stamp duty). For an SME to comply with these taxes, it must obtain the required documentation and it must submit returns on time on the prescribed form. Compliance therefore entails a vast amount of administration. If the requirements are not met or specific information cannot be provided timeously on request, this could result in fines, penalties or the levying of interest.
Incentives
Several support mechanisms and incentives are available to SMEs to help them comply with their taxation requirements and to encourage new business and the expansion of current activities. As part of determining the effectiveness of these programmes, in this study, SMEs were asked to indicate whether they were aware of various tax incentives or government grants and whether they had made use of them. Tax incentives are available in various formats. Some of the incentives take the form of a cash-back offer and others are offered as tax deductions or result in a reduction in the tax that is payable by the SME. Most of the responses in the table reflect a figure of less than 50% which means that more than half of the respondents are not aware of these tax incentives available to them. This may indicate that the tax system is too complex, that tax skills are often lacking in small business enterprises and/or that SARS campaigns are not always successful.
Compliance costs and the tax burden
The respondents were asked to indicate which tax functions they deal with internally (at least partially) and which ones they outsource. The results are reflected in Table 3 . SITE and PAYE) . The outsourcing of these tax functions have inevitable cost implications -indeed, the cost of tax compliance is one of the factors which the literature survey indicates may be detrimental in respect of compliance. Respondents in the survey indicated that, based on the average monthly cost of outsourcing some of their tax functions, outsourcing costs them R13 445 per annum for small establishments and R21 462 per annum for medium establishments. These costs add significantly to their tax burden.
It is interesting to note that the outcome of the SME manufacturing survey in this study confirms many of the findings of the SBP (2005) survey. Approximately half of the small establishments are of the opinion that the burden of complying with tax regulations has increased during the past three years. This perception contributes to a negative tax morale, something which has also been indicated as a factor that could contribute to non-compliance. No fewer than 64.5% of the medium-sized establishments in the sample in this study have experienced an increase in the administrative tasks related to their tax functions during the past three years. Small establishments' pay an average of R8 451 per annum for managing and administering tax functions/responsibilities, compared to R11 311 per annum for medium-sized establishments. These costs are in addition to the costs incurred for work that is outsourced, as discussed above.
The various penalties and interest charges that can be levied on an establishment if it does not comply with all the administrative or legal requirements that are laid down could also have an impact on compliance costs. A total of 33.3% of the respondents have previously been liable for penalties, averaging almost R15 146 per SME. A further 10.7% were liable for interest due to late payments or late submissions.
eFiling
As part of its drive to reduce administration costs for clients, as well as its own costs, SARS has introduced an eFiling service that enables taxpayers to complete and submit some forms electronically and to make electronic payments. Only 33.3% of the respondents indicated that they make use of the eFiling service. The reasons why these taxpayers do not make use of this service are set out in Figure 1 .
Figure 1 Reasons for not using eFiling
No facility 28%
Not aware 23% Security/ confidence concern 49%
It is clear from Figure 1 that SARS will have to embark on a campaign to inform SMEs of the measures that SARS has implemented to address possible security concerns. SMEs will also have to be informed of the success of the eFiling system and problems that cropped up, for example, the number of incorrect allocations of payment. This kind of information will help to build confidence in the system.
Preferred options for reducing the compliance burden
The respondents were asked to indicate which of a range of possible options to reduce the compliance burden they would prefer. A preference index was compiled to assess the preferences for the various tax measures presented to the SMEs. This index was compiled by allocating multiplicator values to each of the rating options ('not preferred', 'preferred' or highly preferred') presented to the participants in the project. The multiplicator values allotted to each of the rating options were as follows: Not preferred = 0; Preferred = 50; Highly preferred = 100 After the multiplicator values had been allocated to each response, the index value for each of the tax measures was computed by calculating the mean (average) value for each variable. The preference index for each of the tax measures presented to the SMEs is shown in Table 4 . It is clear from Table 4 that SMEs show the greatest preference for: reduced tax rates for SMEs; reduced penalties/interest charges by SARS; and a SARS helpdesk.
Perceptions and experience of SARS by SMEs
In SARS's Client charter (SARS 2005) , SARS states that it strives to provide excellent service. Respondents' perceptions of and experiences regarding SARS were therefore investigated. The survey indicated that, on average, small establishments deal with SARS six times a year. By comparison, medium establishments contact SARS eleven times a year (on average). Figures 2 and 3 indicate how small and medium establishments rate their working relationship with SARS. 
Figure 2 Small establishments' working relationship with SARS
Figure 3 Medium establishments' working relationship with SARS
The majority of respondents (72.2%) that interacted with SARS during the past year indicated that they received average to above-average service. From the above figures it is clear that small establishments have a much better working relationship with SARS than medium-sized establishments.
Taxpayers deal with different sections of SARS; therefore they have different experiences based on the point of contact with SARS. Six different aspects of SARS' service were identified and respondents were requested to evaluate the service on a fivepoint Likert scale. The results of this rating are set out in Table 5 . Information and guidelines provided by SARS and the information regarding penalty applications were rated highest by SMEs in terms of SARS's service ( Table 5 ). Aspects that need attention are adjusting mistakes made by SARS, especially for medium-sized establishments, and the service provided by the call centre.
Summary and conclusions
The analyses of the responses indicated that tax compliance places a heavy administrative burden on SMEs. In fact, compliance swallows up resources that could be devoted to a more effective running of these businesses. The majority of SMEs experience their tax liability as an increasing burden; they do not have enough skilled staff to handle tax compliance issues and often have to incur 'extra' tax costs as a result. SMEs are often unaware of the tax incentives and services available to them. Based on the results of the survey, it is clear that the service provided by SARS, although adequate in some aspects, still does not come up to scratch in others. The fact that not even one of the medium-sized establishments (see Figure 3) indicated that it has a very good relationship with SARS is very worrying. It is clear that SARS needs more efficient information campaigns to inform taxpayers of available incentives and services and to build confidence in their systems. As far as the structuring of new tax policies is concerned, it is important to ensure that any changes do not result in an even more complex tax system. It is clear that small businesses (and probably other taxpayers as well) would prefer simple cuts in tax rates and penalties rather than elaborate tax incentive schemes which require sophisticated systems and skilled staff and often result in increasing compliance costs rather than provide real tax relief.
Recommendations
In view of the fact that the research has shown that compliance requirements in South Africa are clearly a stumbling block for SMEs, we suggest that the South African government seriously consider the following:
It could reduce the number of taxes SMEs have to administer. For every type of tax, an additional form or forms usually need(s) to be completed. By reducing the number of taxes, one automatically reduces the number of forms as well. This in turn makes it easier to train staff to administer compliance with the tax liability, because less needs to be taught and less needs to be known. SARS can reduce compliance requirements. For example, the income tax division of SARS could also collect employment-related levies (skills development, unemployment insurance and the workmen's compensation fund). One additional paragraph in the income tax return could then replace a number of the forms required at present. The aim should be to reduce the number of forms that have to be completed, to make the forms shorter and easier to fill in and also to reduce the number of times per year that forms have to be submitted. The law could be streamlined and simplified. For example, there is little need to distinguish between SITE and PAYE on the IRP5 form and in the Fourth Schedule to the Income Tax Act. For example, a simple stipulation that SARS will not refund any PAYE below a certain amount could easily replace a very complex and involved piece of legislation. Additional tools can be made available to SMEs and other taxpayers to assist them in administering taxes. In this regard, the possibility of providing free software packages to taxpayers to calculate tax liability automatically can be considered. Although this would normally be beyond the scope of its duties, SARS could consider making a free accounting package available on the SARS website. This package would have to be capable of automatically generating completed returns that can be submitted electronically. Little human effort would thus be required to complete or to submit the return.
